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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l·!R:O
11.lkHJ\N FOSTER and
r.WTN 1 , , nat11rdl parents

-------------------------------------------

JOHN
of
Jeffrey \drian Ewing, aka Jeffrey
Foster, Deceased, a
minor, and DAVID MAC KELLY,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vs-

No. 19051

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State
of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs' claim of recovery in this case is based upon
the theory that Salt Lake County is an "implied insurer" of employees
driving Salt Lake County vehicles even though not within the course
and scope of their employment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court held that the defendant was indebted to
"'ldinl, tt;

ui

the amount of $15,000 plus costs, attorney's fees and

·'"I 1nlPrest

011

$150,000.00.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment entered by the
I I

l,l I

\'l>lll

t.

STATEMENT or FACTS
All statutorv , el.ere'n<'

lo

the Utah Code Annotd1

1953.
Prior to July l, 1(]77, .':>alt L,ike County's vehicles we
insured by a commercial

insurance company.

On June 13, 1977, t·

Salt Lake County Commission voted to investigate a self-insurn
program.

On June 27, Salt Lake County applied to the Insurance

Commissioner for a Certificate of Self-Insurance pursuant to th
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act (Record p.138).

The Certific

of Self-Insurance was issued on the 7th of July, 1977 (Recordp
Consequently, the commercial insurance was not renewed at thee·
piration of the policy period.
On January 26, 1978, Deputy Sheriff David Mac
off-duty at 4:00 p m.

At approximately 11:00 p.m., while drivr

a Salt Lake County vehicle under the influence of alcohol,
Kelly collided with a pedestrian, Jeffrey Adrian Ewing, plaint;
sixteen-year-old son, and Deputy Kelly fled the scene of them
dent.

Jeffrey Ewing died as a result of the injuries received
Deputy Kelly was terminated from the Sheriff's Deparc

and convicted of automoblle homicide and leaving the scene ofi
accident (Record Exh. D-15).

Jeffrey Ewing's parents filed a

wrongful death action against Deputy Kelly, former Sheriff Delc
Larson, Sheriff Rex L. Vance and Salt Lake County (Civil Case
No. C-78-1377).

Kelly conL1r t2d

h1s

private insurance carrier

sent a letter to the Salt l.ake County Conuni ssion, with a copy·
the Summons and Complaint, stating, "it would appear that your
surance applies" (Record p.

;1,).

On Mar 1 h 23, 1978, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
l11l 1n,,d to rq.ire:ot'nt Mr. Kelly for Mr. Kelly's failure to comply
. '111 11"
:

Jhi-'1X-l

1

Tndemni fication of Public Officers and Employees Act
el seq.) (Record p.93).
On January 4, 1979, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed

<letend;ints Larson, Vance and Salt Lake County from the lawsuit
(Record p.208).

Salt Lake County did not know at the time of the

dismissal that Kelly had secretly entered into an agreement with
plaintiffs whereby he agreed not to contest his negligence in causing the death of Jeffrey Ewing.

Kelly also agreed, as a part of

this secret arrangement, to assign any cause of action he may have
had against Salt Lake County to Foster and Ewing, and they, in turn,
agreed not to execute against Kelly's personal assets (Record p.12-16).
On January 5, 1979, the day following the voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs presented their evidence in an uncontested trial
before Third District Court Judge David K. Winder.

Salt Lake County

was not informed of this hearing and, of course, was not present.
Judge Winder awarded a judgment against Kelly in the amount of
;;150,000.00.
Plaintiffs then filed this action against Salt Lake County
seeking a judgment declaring Salt Lake County to be liable to the
plc1intiffs in Lhe amount of $100,000.00.
The case was set for a jury trial on June 28, 1979.
11 1 1l

h· ,,
fl,.

I

did not proceed as scheduled.
, i·1 .. 1 ion

The

Rather, Judge James S. Sawaya

for Summary Judgment on the pleadings at that time.

2r.1ntPd .Judgmenl against Salt Lake County in the amount of
·ll, (J(Jl)

00 (even though the Complaint only prayed for $100, 000. 00) ·

-3-

This Court ',_,,,_,, s:·d

111.

·

nler gi·anting suIIllilary judgme 1
!.1l P.2d 810 (1981) and r-

in Foster v. Salt__
the case for trial

( I-<'"''""1 [·

I

The tr:ui 1 was he: LJ <>n ,)eptc-:111ber 13, 1982, before the
Honorable David B. Dee, Ll1s[rirt Judge, without a jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXTENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S LIABILITY AS A "SELFINSURER" IS LIMITED TO PAYMENT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS.
of Utah Automobile No-Fault provis

A.

Prior to the adoption of the Utah Automobile No-Fault
surance Act in 1973, public entities were not required to carry
public liability insurance.

Section 41-12-33 specifically exem

the 0n.ted States, lhe State of Utah, or any of its
divisions, from the provisions of the Safety Responsibility
In 1973, however, the Legislature adopted the Utah Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act, Section 31-41-1, et seq., which provide
in part as follows:
The State of Utah and all of its political subdivisions and their respective departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain in effect
continuously in respect to their motor vehicles,
the security provided for in Section 31-41-5.
The provisions of Section 31-41-5 provide two mutuall
exclusive alternative methods wherel:,y the required security car
provided.

Subsection (a1 ;iutl11JrLzes security to be provided

tr

an automobile insurance pol icy which qualifies under the Safen
Responsibility Act.

Subsection

(b)

permits security to be pro1

"by any other method aµproved by t lw Department (of Insurance)
affording security Pquivalent

t<;

1,

thcit offered by a policy of i:

Th,;t subsection also states that the "person providing this

cinrc
1

YI,,_, <>I ,;ecurity shall have all of the obligations and rights of an

un<:i_e_i::___t_l:'._is act," i.e., the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
.-1,-'

"t

l Yrl (emphasis added).
In this case, Salt Lake County provided security through

the means of an annual tax levy from which judgments against the
County could be paid.

The Insurance Commissioner is empowered to

issue a Certificate of Self-Insurance when he finds that an applicant qualifies under Section 31-41-5.

On July 1, 1977, a Certifi-

cate of Self-Insurance was issued to Salt Lake County by the Insurance Department of the State of Utah (Record p.140).

The Certifi-

cate in pertinent part states as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that pursuant to the Insurance Code of the State of Utah, Salt Lake
County has complied with Section 31-41-5(l)(b)
of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Law
and has qualified as a self-insurer."
In order to determine the obligations of the self-insurance
which Salt Lake County assumed, it is necessary to refer to the NoFault Insurance Act.

The limits of liability to the County are as

set forth in the No-Fault Act which provides in detail the extent
of benefits to which an injured party may be entitled.

By thus de-

fining the benefits, the limits of liability applicable to the
publi< entity are clearly established.
fhe method for providing security as approved by the InCummi ssioner, i.e., the levy of taxes for the payment of
i''d;.;rn<-r1to, artd the establishment of coverage as provided in the No' "' l L J nsurance Act were properly found by the Insurance Commissioner
1 ,,

, •111stit

ut.e a substantially equivalent security.
-5-

Neither the

adequacy of the security n<ir !·fi, .1pproval by the Insurance ColllJL.
sioner is challengen
The duties of a selt-111surc1· uuder the No-Fault Act
clearly established.

r

i\s puinte-d uut above, Section 31-41-5(11,

provides that the party provid1ng the alternate type of securn
"

shall have a Ll of the obligations and rights of an insur·
" under the No-Fault Act.

The obligations of an insurer

ur

the Act, which constitute the terms of the policy, are set fort•
in detail in Section 31-41-6 (a copy of that statute is
the Appendix of this Brief).

The language of the statute is si

nificant:
"(1) Every insurance policy or other securitt

with the re uirements of Subsection 1 o
Section I- - s a
provi e persona injury protection providing for payments to the insured and
all other persons suffering personal injury arising
out of an accident involving a motor vehicle, except
as otherwise provided in this Act, in at least the
following minimum amounts." (emphasis added).
Subsection (2) sets forth the manner in which
expenses are to be determined and the remaining subsections fur
clarify the application of the section.
Thus the "other security" approved by the Insurance

C.

missioner as qualifying a governmental entity to become a self·
insurer under the No-Fault Act requires the entity to undertake
responsibilities of an insurer and become obligated to pay not
to the insured but to "r11 J "'

hPr

pecsons suffering personal in1

arising out of an accident invulv1ng a motor vehicle" owned by
political subdivision, in "at least the minimum amounts", as
fied in that Act

SI'

There is no dispute in this case that Salt:

County has paid the nu-fault benefits to the plaintiffs

hy

this

."-<'t

B.

The trial court correct! held that the defendant
is not an insurance carrier nor is t ere an insurance
contract involved in this case.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges:
"4.

That under the provisions of the Utah Code Annotated

and by action of the Salt Lake County Commission and specifically
pursuant to the provisions of 63-30-1 through 34, the defendant is
required to provide indemnity and insurance coverage to the judgment
debtor, David Mac Kelly, in the sum of $100,000 plus interest, costs,
and attorney's fees, and that plaintiffs are entitled to the proceeds
of that contract of indemnity;
5.

That defendant is the automobile liability insurer

of plaintiff, David Mac Kelly, and as such is indebted to all plaintiffs as alleged in paragraph 4 of this complaint; ... " (emphasis
added).
Prior to trial, plaintiffs' theory was that in order for
the County to be liable, it was either the insurance carrier of
plaintiff Kelly or bound by an insurance contract between the County
and plaintiff Kelly.

Plaintiffs' position was clearly represented

to the trial court as follows:
"MR. KIPP:
.;r

i_mp[1,_d

by which they are bound, I don't win.

fHE COURT:
MR. KIPP:
1

l1.1l '"'

If there isn't a contract of insurance, express

That's right.
If there is, I win, presuming we meet the terms.

\vhat this case is all about." (p.42 trial transcript)
fhe trial court at page 2 of its Memorandum Decision stated
-7-

that " ... no insurance policy is involved."
County liable to the minimum l irn1
self-insurer.

(Finding Ol

fd< l

t :>

rk

It went on to hold-

,,f Section 41-12-l(k) as a
l)

I

Plaintiffs' theory .,f ceCc)Very under a contract,

expr

or implied, was specifically re1ected by the trial court
have been the key finding of fact in a judgment of no cause of
The statute (31-41-S(b)) provides that a self-insurer
has the obligations of an insurer under this act.
the no-fault act.

"This act" i•

The obligations of an insurer under the act

set out in Section 31-41-6 as payment of no-fault benefits.

Tu

that the County is a self-insurer under the Safety Responsibili
Act would absolutely contradict Section 42-12-33 of that
specifically states that the act does not apply to governmental
entiti.c:s.
C.

Section 63-30-29. 5 and Allstate v. USF&G should
retroactive application in this case.

The trial court's decision is based upon a strainedc
struction of the Supreme Court's holding in Allstate Insurance
Utah 619 P.2d 329 (1980).

The Allstate case holds

an insurance policy which is used as security under the
Act must comply with the "qualifications" of an insurance polic
set forth in Section 41-12-21 of the Safety Responsibility ActAllstate case did not deal with

security which the(

has used to qualify as a self-insurer
interesting tu
thc1L the trial court casually brush<
aside the defendant's uncontroverte<l case law dealing with se
insurance from other jurisdictions cited in its Trial
stating: "The statute does not refer to self-insurance so its
argument in this regard i_s not germa1n." (Page 2 Memorandum
Decision).
'
-8-

This action was filed more than one year before this Court's
de1

is ion in the: filstate case which explains why the plaintiffs never

ra'

t-he Allstate theory in their Complaint and never relied on

that

1·cisP

because it limits their recovery to the sum of $15,000.00.
lhe Allstate case is not controlling because it applies

to contracts of insurance used as security under the No-Fault Act
and should not be retroactively applied in this case because
(1) plaintiffs never relied upon it, and (2) the County had

no statutory notice or guidance from this Court when the cause of
action arose in 1978 that it could be held liable under the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act.
The same rationale applies to the newly-enacted Section
63-30-29.5 which extends coverage for permissive users to governmental entities as of May, 1983.
D.

Self-insurers, in most other 'urisdictions, are not
o igate un er
ru es o exten e po icy situations such as permissive use.

The District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1,
California, had a very similar factual situation in the case of
Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, 51 Cal. Rptr.
789 (1966), wherein that Court ably articulated the differences involved in "self-insurance" settings.
casP

Although in the Glens Falls

the defendant had obtained a certificate of self-insurance

'·nder the California Safety Responsibility Act (and the County has
•

1

1

!

r 11c:d

one in this case only under the No-Fault Act), that Court

-9-

"Defendant Consol id.lt:d 'c; not an insurance carrier.
Nor does th1c. •.·ac;e tn1")l1•, ;my motor vehicle liability
policy issHed 'llld "''1i i mdj ng at the time of the accident. Consolidated 1:0 11wrely an authorized selfinsurer or, to put it 1nocc exa,·tly, a company to
which the Moror Vehicle neµartment has issued a
certificate of self insurance. Neither the Vehicle
Code sections referring lo self-insurance (§§16055,
16056) nor any other sections of said code contain
any provisions that such certificate is or constitutes
a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance or that
said certificate shall be deemed to incorporate or
embrace provisions required in such policies (§16451).
Indeed the Vehicle Code nowhere intimates any connection between section 16451 and sections 16055, 16056.
A certificate of self-insurance is not a motor vehicle
liability policy of insurance. In a word, it is not an
insurance policy at all and plaintiff has offered no
authority that it is. As we previously explained, it
is merelb one of the several methods provided by laWfor esta lish1n exem tion from furnishin secur1t .
Face wit t ese rea ities, G ens Fa s attempts to
transmogrify the certificate of "self-insurance" by
dropping the word "self", to assume that the resultant
product is "insurance" and thereafter to engraft on
such "insurance" all of the rules dealing with liability
insurance. No authority, statutory or decisional, supports such a construction.
c

The simple answer here is that this case does
not involve the contractual obligations of an insurance company, Nor are any obligations or any
rules of extended policy situations in any way
imposed upon Consolidated." (emphasis added)
The California Court thus held that the plaintiff's
attempt to engraft standard form insurance provisions onto a "self
insurer" program of risk retention was devoid of merit.

It speci-

fically held at page 795 that:
" ... [S]ection 16451 [the requirement of an omnibus
coverage of permissive use1 s] dnes not create any
independent legal J1abil1Ly trn the negligent operation of a motor 1•PhJ•.
by a permissive user. As we
have explained, th,Jt :;c•ction merely prescribes the
necessary terms and provisions of an insurance
policy furnished as 1->rnof 'lf ability to respond in
damages and thus cnnstituting one of the several
methods of establishing exemption from the requirement of depos1t1ng security to satisfy any final
Judgment or Juclgm<>nts tor Lodily injury or property
. 10

damage (§16057). Indeed, the Automobile Financial
Responsibility Law 'does not in so many words make
mdndatory.the procuring of a liability insurance
policy prior to the first accident and judgment***'"
(Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., supra
46 Cal. 2d 423, 436, 296 P.2d 801 808 57 A.L.R.
2d 914.)
'
'
The Court of Appeals of New York has similarly held that
self-insurance is not "insurance" at all when dealing with financial
responsibility acts.

In Guercio v. Hertz Corp., 358 N.E.2d 261,

264 (1976) that Court held:
"Generally, self-insurance is no insurance at all.
Rather, self-insurance in this context, is a convenient shorthand for describing the manner in which
a class of vehicle owners may comply with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act."
" ... The crux of the matter is that a financially able
fleet owner may avoid the necessity of obtaining liability insurance and paying insurance premiums. By
undertaking to assure payment of judgments, the owner
does not become an "insurer" of anything other than
his own ability to pay for damages for which he is
legally responsible. (citations omitted). In sum,
self-insurance is not insurance but an assurance
an assurance that judgments will be paid."
The Court went on to conclude that absent a separate
rentdl agreement between Hertz and the customer, liability for damages
caused by permissive users would not arise simply because Hertz was
a self-insurer.

[Similar conclusions in Location Auto Leasing

Cor.r_. v. Lembo Corp., 310 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (1970); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co

v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 284 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (1967)].
The Texas Supreme Court has also followed the general
addressed by the California and New York Courts

1 ,1

«l 1d

.1

,

c>rlificate of self-insurance does not constitute other

dJtd

''l'"'t'1lo1-'s

collectable insurance within the meaning of an
liability policy issued to an employee driving a self-11-

insured employer's car with its permission on personal business at

__!:1ome__

the time of the accidenc

and Refining Co., 311'.i S.W.2d 861
Insurance Company v. Zellars

(lP''

__f_ompany v. Humble 01
Cl.v. App. 1958); Allstate

4'.JJ S.\>/ 2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970

affirmed by Supreme Court of Texas in l-162 S.W.2d 550, 552 [l] (197'
Under California law, al 1 po lie ies of insurance issued ar
certified in that state must include coverage for any permissive
user of an insured motor vehicle.

In a recent case, Western

Insurance v. Es ta te of Taira (September 29, 1982) , California Court
of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, that court dealt with a surprisingly similar factual situation (except that the driver of
state vehicle was within the course and scope of his employment).
On January 23, 1978, two state parole agents, Eugene Taira, the
driver,

drJ

Roy Longmire, passenger, were killed when a state-ownec

1974 Plymouth driven by Taira collided with another vehicle.

Then

was evidence that both Taira and Longmire were under the influence
of alcohol.

Taira and Longmire were in the course and scope of

their employment at the time of the accident and Taira was driving
the 1974 Plymouth with permission of the owner and his employer,
the State of California

Subsequently, Longrnire's widow and childr

brought an action for wrongful death against the estate of Taira
an<l others under Labor Code Section :160l(a)(2), which permits suit
against a fellow employee for injury or death resulting from intm
cation.

As a result of that action. Western Pioneer, the

carrier for decedent driver, Taira, hrought an action for declarat
relief to determine whether its policy of insurance covered Taira
while he was driving a state

car, and whether the state, a

insured owner of the vehicle, was liable to defend and indem-

sel t
11[

fy the estate of Taira in Longmire's wrongful death action.
The declaratory relief action was tried by the court with-

u11

l

1ury

d

ance

1

The trial court determined that Western Pioneer Insur-

ompany provided no coverage for the accident.

It further de-

termined that the state was required to provide a defense and to
indemnify the estate of Taira, holding that the state, as a selfinsured owner of the motor vehicle, owed the same duty to indemnify
and defend as that owed by an insurance carrier.

The State of

California appealed and the court of appeal reversed.
Under California Insurance Code Section 11580.l(b), certain required provisions are set forth which must be included in
each policy of liability insurance.

One of these requirements is

coverage for "permissive users."
In California, the obligations arising from a policy of
insurance do not extend to a self-insurer.

Metro U.S. Services,

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 96 C.A. 3d 678 (1979).
The respondent in Western Pioneer also argued that the
state, as employer, was liable under the dual capacity doctrine
because liability was being imposed upon the state as an insurer,
rather than an employer.
t

The appellate court reiterated its posi-

ion that the state's duties as a self-insurer are not the same as

<111

insui-ei-, and thus the dual capacity doctrine did not apply.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INDEMNIFICA1 JON OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACTS DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the Indem-13-

nification of Public Offi('ers

i

et. seq.), and the Governmenr,d

1d

l.!llJ·l•.vees

J11u11<1111tv

seq.), do not apply to this case.

All

/\ct (Section 63-48-1

,\,·t (Section 63-30-1 et

hough Lhis was a reserved

issue of law in the Pretrial C!rckr 'Par.J

ll C.), the Amended

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law tail to mention the court'.
ruling on this issue contained in its Memorandum Decision.
A.

The lndenmification of Public Officers and Employee:

Pursuant to Section 63-48-3, the County declined to
Kelly or to pay any compromise, settlement or judgment resulting
from said personal in jury action.

This decision was based on Kelli

failure to timely tender his defense, cooperate in his defense,
his grossly negligent conduct which occurred outside the scope of
his emp1 ''vmenL
l'he Indemnification Act was analyzed in 1974 Utah Law
Review 622 as follows:
"The public entity is not obligated to defend or
indemnify an officer or employee unless he requests
a defense in writing within ten days after service
of process upon him. If the request for defense is
properly made, the public entity chooses to defend,
to defend with reservation, or not to defend. If the
public entity chooses to defend and the officer or
employee reasonably cooperates in the defense, then
the public entity is obligated to pay any judgment,
compromise, or settlement resulting from the suit.
If the officer or employee does not reasonably cooperate, the public entity may terminate the defense
and pay nothing. If the public entity chooses to
defend with reservation, it may reserve the right
not to pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement
until it is established
the claim arose out of
an act or omission occur Ling "during the performance
of [the officer's or 1-'mployee's] duties, within the
scope of his employment, •>r· under color of authority.
If the public entity choosec; not to defend the officer or employee may recover from the pubiic entity
the costs of his defense and any judgment (not a
compromise or sett l r>rnPnt;, unlJ; if

la) [h[e establishes that the act or omission upon
wh i ,. h t he judgment is based occurred during the
µertormdnce of his duties, within the scope of his
emµloyment, or under color of authority and that
he conducted the defense of the claim against him
irt good faith; and
(ii) [t]he public entity fails to establish that the
officer or employee acted or failed to act due to
gross negligence, fraud, or malice. (§63-48-4(2)]

If the public entity pays any portion of a judgment
(not a compromise or settlement) it may recover that
payment from the officer or employee by establishing
that he acted or failed to act due to gross negligence,
fraud, or malice. Otherwise, the officer or employee
is not liable to indemnify the public entity for
defense costs or payments made by it as a result of
any claim made against the public entity or against
the officer or employee.
Analysis--Before the enactment of the Indemnification Act, the extent to which public officers and
employees would be personally liable for their
official actions was often subject to the discretionary power of superiors. The boundaries of
official immunity are vague and are determined
according to federal standards in federal courts
and state standards in state courts. Permissive
insurance coverage provided by a public entity
can vary according to budgetary pressures, the
judgment of those empowered to obtain insurance,
and the status of the officer or employee. Indemnification by petition to the Board of Examiners
and the legislature can be time consuming and difficult to obtain, inconsistent from case to case,
and arbitrarily administered, since no standards
are defined. Under the Indemnification Act, the
protection from personal liability is comprehensive,
covering intentional as well as negligent actions;
mandatory rather than permissive; and
all officers and employees whatever their position
ur function ... "
"The Indemnification Act seems to give broad dis' ret1on to the public entity in deciding
or not Lo defend an officer or employee requesting
defense, since the Act contains no guide[ i ne" or pr ucedural protections."
rhe County asserted six affirmative defenses under the
i1:d«rnn1 t [,·ation Act:
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(1)

Failure to properly tender defense within ten days

(2)

Failure to coup1cr,Hc

(3)

Employee was

un

ir1

delense;

a ''trnl ,,, " of his own and not wit 1,

the course and scope of his erupl

1

1vnwnl;

(4)

Employee was grossly negligent;

(5)

Employee's defense was not conducted in good faith·,

(6)

Employee has paid nothing, is under no liability fc

and,

payment and is therefore not entitled to be indemnified.
( 1)

Utah's Indemnification Statute is an actual loss pL

The general rule at common law has long been that the

ir,.

demnitee must first pay an obligation before indemnification is
quired.

42 CJS lndemni ty §14c.

Thus, in Cunningham v. Metropolit

Gov't., 476:; :,'.2d 640 (Tenn. 1972), the court held a city did not
have to pay a Judgment, under their indemnification statute, agarn
a police officer who was killed in the accident giving rise to
suit.

The estate was insolvent and no payment to the

available.

The court recognized that the indemnity statutes were

to protect the employee which, in this case, no longer needed
tection.
A close reading of the Indemnification Act supports the
payment first requirement.

There is no mandatory language in S&·

tion 63-48-3 that the County indemnify any employee except should
the County conduct his defense.

as the County did not

conduct Kelly's defense, the langucigt· uf Section 63-48-4(1) is th
only basis for any indemnificati"n

That section provides for in

dernnification once the " . . employ,_.,., pays .inv judgment ... "
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The in

dPmnification plan is, therefore, that if the employee conducts his
ovm de
the
1

tens<', the employee will pay his own judgment.

Then, after

111dgment is paid, he may be indemnified if it turns out that

!,e 1>rnnty has such an obligation.

This approach is entirely con-

si stenl with the literal meaning of indemnification and reflects
a

legislative encouragement that defenses be conducted by the mu-

nicipality involved.
find that the Indemnification Act

(2)

ic

to

ie .

The Indemnification Act is clear, Section 63-48-1 states
that the purpose of the Act is to protect employees.

There is no

indication that the Act is intended to be an insurance plan whereby
third parties are paid for torts of the employee.

Therefore, absent

liability, there is no legislative purpose in paying an employee.
A close reading of the compromise settlement agreement
shows that Kelly has no liability.

The judgment creditors (former

plaintiffs) have covenanted not to seek recovery from Kelly.

It

is difficult to conceive how the County is obligated to indemnify
a person that has no liability.
The law is well-settled that a release of a servant releases the master of liability where the master's alleged tort is
asserted under respondeat superior.
In,
i

, 493 P.2d 625 (Utah 1972).

Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel,

Similarly, the law has long been

he! t the re I ease of a debtor releases a surety.

r;1.11n
lfl(>t1

1.,,

I <11;·

1 ""'-'"'':

,
rr1

172 P. 780 (Okla. 1918).
Ie

Shut tee v. Coalgate

Utah law also follows the com-

tha l re lase of one tort-feasor releases all tort-

s un LPss there has been a reservation of rights against the
-17-

Though this Court has not ruled specifically on whether
the release of an indemnitPe

lhP

apparent reason to follow

,1

sepa1a11

policies involved make it

e,,Pn

rn0r

indemnitor, there is oo

,-ulc from that above.

In tJ,

e ,1µrir Gpriate to apply the rek

rule in indemnification because nu protection of the employee is
needed, which is at the very heart of the purpose of indemnificati
The reservation of rights in the contract releasing Kell,
is without meaning.
indemnification.

A judgment creditor has no rights in Kelly's

They cannot reserve what they do not have.

Ther:

fore, relieving Kelly of liability relieves the County of any obli,
gation to indemnify h:un for incurring no loss or liability.
B.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Section 63-30-7 provides:
lmmunity from suit of all governmentalentities is
waived for injury resulting from the negligent
operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or
other equipment while in the scope of his employment.
. (emphasis added).
The plaintiffs initially relied upon the Governmental
Immunity Act to establish liability and plead in their complaint
that Kelly was in the course and scope of his duties with Salt Lak,
County.

However, there was no finding of fact that Kelly was witl

or outside the scope of his employment at the time of the collisio
Salt Lake County, as a governmental entity, is immune
from suit for money damages, except as immunity is waived by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.,
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act,
all governmental enti i_ies shal 1 be immune from
suit for any injury wh11h may result from the
activities of said entities wherein said entity
is engaged in the
and discharge of a
governmental function., Section 63-:l0-'3.
, j

8

fn this case, since there is no affirmative finding that
!' ! ,.1ir1L1

1hc1 tic

t t Ke 11 y was within the course and scope of his employment,

:, f.-,nct,1nt,
1,I >111ltff

SaJ t

1.ake County, is under no obligation to indemnify

Kelly or his assignees (Foster and Ewing), nor has the

d'"lt,nd:rnr County waived its immunity from suit.
This Lmmunity from suit applies equally to any theory of
tecovery the Court relied upon.

Plaintiffs cannot avoid this issue

by merely claiming that they are not pursuing their action under the
Governmental Immunity Act.

That act made it possible for certain

aclions to be maintained against governmental entities that were
formerly immune from suit.

Those entities retain immunity against

suits for injury resulting from the negligent operation by an employee of a motor vehicle while outside the scope of his employment. 2
The County asserted Section 63-30-7 as an affirmative defense at tcial, and the Court erred in finding the Act inapplicable.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY
IS BOUND BY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEPUTY KELLY.
A.

The judgment obtained by plaintiffs Foster and Ewing
a ainst laintiff Kell cannot be enforced a ainst
t e County ecause it was o taine t roug co usion.

(1)

Factual background.

The lawsuit against Deputy

David Mac Kelly (Civil No. C-78-1377) originally included Salt Lake
c,,unty as a co-defendant under a theory of respondeat superior.
fhe affidavit of defendant's counsel of July 27, 1979, asserts that

1"'"1 r y
'"tiff's

;, ''>'t
. l, ..•\

l, 1978, counsel received a telephone call from the

attorney, Carman E. Kipp.

Mr. Kipp indicated that his

for the newly-enacted provisions of Section 63-30-29.5
l 'J 'J ., .
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intention was to secure a judgment against David Mac Kelly and
pursue his claim against his

's uninsured motorist carrier.

Upon this representation, the County c1grPed to a voluntary dismis.
The County did not know, anJ Mr

Kipp did not inform opposing coun,

that on December 12, 1978, the plaint1ff.s had entered into a com·
promise settlement agreement with David Mac Kelly whereby Kelly
consented to allow plaintiffs to proceed with a non-jury trial
wherein Kelly would not contest the issue of negligence and liabil·
ity.

Secondly, Kelly agreed to assign any rights he may have

against Salt Lake County to the plaintiffs.

Thirdly, plaintiffs

agreed not to execute upon any personal assets of Kelly but insteK
to pursue their claims against Salt Lake County only.

Further,

the plaintiffs agreed that after two years, or the conclusion of
any litigacrcn against Salt Lake County, the judgment would be
released and satisfied against Kelly.
On January 4, 1979, the County's attorney of record sigm
a stipulation for an order of dismissal without prejudice.

The

trial was scheduled to begin January 29, 1979, and the County's
representatives intended to attend.

A special trial setting for

January 5, 1979, was prearranged by plaintiffs' counsel for the
day following the signing of the stipulation.

The County was not

informed of the trial setting, although it was obviously known of
prior to January 4, 1979.
their evidence.

At that hearing, the plaintiffs present·

Al though Deputy KF 11 v

•..i<1

s rep resented by counsel.

no evidence was presented to rebut c1ny uf the plaintiffs' contentt
After plaintiffs' closing argument, the Court asked Kell
attorney, "Do you wish to responcP"

-20-

Kelly's attorney responded,

"l havP no statement."
No

objections were made to any of plaintiffs' evidence.

:,nnc_ ot the plaintiffs' witnesses were cross-examined.
i

Kelly's

urney µresented no evidence to support Kelly's affirmative de-

tenses ,_·ontained in his answer, i.e., comparative negligence of the
decedent (wearing dark clothing and crossing a heavily-traveled
streer at night not at a marked pedestrian crossing).

The Court

entered a judgment against Kelly in the amount of $150,000, the
exact amount prayed for by plaintiffs' counsel.
(2)

Collusion defined.

Webster's New Collegiate Die-

tionary, 1977, defines collusion as "secret agreement or cooperation
for an illegal or deceitful purpose".

It defines deceitful as

"having a tendency or disposition to deceive; a: not honest, b: deceptive, misleading".
"Collusion" has been judicially defined as:
"
. a corrupt agreement between the parties to
impose a case on the court, either by the suppression of evidence or the manufacture thereof, as
well as an
that no defense shall be made."
(emphasis added).
In Curb and Gutter District No. 37 v. Parrish, 110 P.2d
902, 907 (8th Cir. 1940) the Court said:
"It is generally recognized that collusion in law
embraces either a fictitious or assumed state of
facts in order to obtain a judicial determination."
This is precisely the case now before the Court.

The

plaintiff agreed to secure a judicial determination solely
f·>t the· purpose of imposing liability on Salt Lake County.
trc>rn

-1N, u

Apart

the issue of liability, the factual question of damages was
297 Mich. 654, 298 N.W. 318, 320 (1941).
-21-

substantial but remained uncontesLed

Dismissing Salt Lake County

was merely a ploy to avoid oµposit1nn tn the lawsuit.

The judgrner

rendered ($150,000.00) is several times the highest wrongful deaU
verdict for an unmarried minor child previously rendered in the
State of Utah.

This in itself is an indication that the parties

based their claim of damages upon a false or assumed state of face
The result itself fails to sustain good faith.
The fact that there had been a previous compromise sett!•
ment agreement between Kelly and the plaintiffs Foster and Ewing
under the circumstances is evidence of collusion.

This evidence

is strengthened by the fact that the County was not informed of
the secret stipulation while the County was still a party to the
lawsuit, nor was it informed of the special non-jury trial date.
The County was led to believe that plaintiffs' intention was to
pursue uninsured motorist coverage.

The players were merely

positioned to use the court process to establish an uncontested
judgment for the sole purpose of imposing it upon the County.
There can be no doubt that the facts and circumstances surrounding
the December 12, 1978, compromise settlement agreement, the Januan
1979, stipulation for voluntary dismissal and the January 5, 1979.

uncontested non-jury trial and resulting judgment evidence "collu·
sion" as previously defined.
B.

Non-disclosure as against £Ublic policy.

Even were this Court to hold as a matter of law that tht
December 12, 1978, compromise settlement agreement was not

-22-

.

or unethical conduct,

4

the modern trend of cases hold that pre-trial

,,vrcncints not to execute made between a plaintiff and one of several
, le

Cendan ts without the knowledge of all the parties to the law-

cui t render the judgment obtained in such action unenforceable.

The Arizona Supreme Court in Mustang Equipment, Inc. v.
Welch v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., .564 P.2d 895

(Ariz. 1977) reasoned that public policy requires immediate disclosure

of any agreement not to execute between a plaintiff and a co-defendant
in order "to avoid the inherent tendency to work a fraud on the court
and to avoid 'collusion' between the plaintiff and some of the defendants". (at p.899).
In the Mustang case, the unanimous court, in reversing a
judgment against Mustang, found that even though the non-agreeing
defendant was not prejudiced at trial by the non-disclosure nor
would the defense have been conducted differently had the pre-trial
agreement been disclosed, nevertheless, it held:
"It has always been the policy of the law to favor
and encourage the resolution of controversies through
compromise and settlement rather than through litigation. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1
( 1962). In the instant case, the disclosure of the
Welch-Mountain States agreement may have well fostered or encouraged a pre-trial settlement between
Welch and Mustang. At least, we cannot say that
Mustang's counsel would not have taken
m?re
positive attitude into settlement negotiations
had he been aware of the agreement . . . "

Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State
!,Rule I 1
n.H ',h 11"n 2. An attorney or counselor
n?t: (5) Take
tn deceit r1r collusion, or consent thereto with
to deceive
c1 ('ou1-c or judge or a party to an action or proceeding.
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"Finally, we think thi:o is i !llalter of public policy.
While 1-ie rccogni2.e th,:ll unde1- the particular fact
situation of this cdse
was neither fraud, collusion or unethical cc)nduct involved, we cannot
condone secret
a plaintiff and
defendant whicF by tneir very secretiveness, may
tend to encourage wrongrtolng and which, at the
least, may rend to lessen the public's confidence
in our adversary system." (at p.900). (emphasis
added).
C.

Covenant not to sue released the county.

The sipulation between Kelly and plaintiffs Foster and
Ewing in this case, which they termed a "compromise settlement
agreement", provided:
5. Plaintiffs agree and covenant that they will
not execute against the defendant upon such Judgment
in any manner or proceeding other than against Salt
Lake County or any insurance company affording liability coverage to the defendant at the time and
place alleged in plaintiffs' first cause of action.
Tr.e judgment wi 11 be released and satisfied by the
plaintiffs upon the conclusion or compromise of
all actions and proceedings against any insurance
companies and/or Salt Lake County; however, said
release and satisfaction of said judgment is to
occur at the end of two years from the date of
entry of judgment herein, unless at that time
there is pending in any court of law an action
by plaintiff against any insurance company or
Salt Lake County wherein plaintiff alleges that
said company or Salt Lake County owed a duty to
indemnify defendant or that it afforded liability
coverage to the defendant at the time and place
alleged in the first cause of action of plaintiffs' complaint herein, in that event said
judgment will be released and satisfied upon
the conclusion or compromise of said pending
action or actions. (emphasis added) (Record p.14)
Obviously, in this case, the plaintiffs have no legal
right to recover dam2ges again0oc Kel J y.

Consequently, an ordinar"

insurance carrier under a standard policy or under an approved
policy under the Safety Responsibility Act would not be obligated
to the plaintiffs.
773 (N.C. 1973).

(See Huffman

,1.

_f_e_ei:

193 S. E.2d

fhe Supreme Court of this state has held that a similar
nut to sue entered into between a plaintiff and a negligent
«perdtes as a total release of the employer.

1npJ, '"-'
l>1e'Oel,

Holmstead v.

l_n_'::_., 493 P-2d 625 (Utah 1972).

In

the plaintiff initiated an action against

the corporate defendant alleging that its employee, while operating
his motor vehicle within the scope of his employment, negligently
caused plaintiff injuries.

The employee's insurance carrier ob-

Lained a covenant not to sue for a consideration of $10,000, the
maximum coverage under the employee's policy.

The trial court's

holding that the covenant not to sue operated as a matter of law
to release the master or principal from liability was affirmed by
this Court citing the case of Simpson v. Townsley, (CA 10th, 1960),
283 F.2d 743, with approval, indicating that the "covenant not to

sue constituted a complete exoneration of the employee and removed
any foundation upon which to impute negligence to the employer."
(at p.628).
Similarly, in this case, former Deputy Kelly is not legally obligated to pay damages to the plaintiffs Foster and Ewing.
An ordinary insurer would, under the rationale of the Huffman and
Holmstead cases, therefore, not be obligated to plaintiffs.
The purpose of requiring an indemnitor to pay only damages
1 1,_,,

r-h" indemni tee would be legally obligated to pay is to prevent

r ],,

,,_,1-y kind of thing:

1,,

1 • Lhird

Ji_:IJ1]ily

a collusive agreement between the employee

pdr-ty that is made solely for the purpose of imposing

on the employer.
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D.

context is :'7'._l_!:d dL1<

A stipulated Judgment
termination.

is

rights in this

1o
d

'.·ont ract, not a judicial de

Owen v. Burn Cowot.r-'-_C<:!_, ';bl P.2d 91 (N.M. 1977);

49 CJS Judgments §173.

Contracts whiLh are injurious to the pub!

good are void because of public policy.
188 P.377 (Mont. 1920).

See Spaulding v. Maillet,

The test of public policy was stated in

Goldberg v. Sanglier, 616 P.Ld 1239 (Wash. App. 1980) as:
"The test of public policy is not what the parties
did or contemplated doing in order to carry out
their agreement, or even the result of its performance; it is whether the contract as made has
a "tendency to evil", to be against the public
good, or to be injurious to the public. At 1247.
Under the original action of the plaintiffs against Kell
and the (n•Tty, the defendants were not joint tort feasors.

The

County was joined under a theory of respondeat superior which
a unity of identity to the two defendants.

The relationship of a

deputy sheriff to the County is more than that of servant and
master because of the nature of the office.

A deputy sheriff is

not just an employee but a public officer.

Pfister v. Niobrara Cc

557 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1976).
The contract leading to a judgment against Kelly withoot
a defense being required and assigning indemnification rights suft
from the same policy objections as buying a witness.
to relieve one of a $1SO,OOO Judgment
perjury and the perversion of just ice.
523 P.2d 842 (Nev. 197tl)

The promise

lends itself to encouraging
See Western Cab Co. v. Kt

Any public officer defending a

be open to personal pressurc2 to waive contesting liability in exc
for cooperation against the indeurn1 tying municipality because of

-2fi-

1,,,r

ent

1.,;-

111

1 dl

Lo escape personal liability.

This clearly is an incentive

'"mployee to commit perjury or at least shade facts.

nw

entering of an unopposed judgment is not the same as

11

:I
1

5etLl1ng a Lawsuit with one tort-feasor in this context because of
che reL1tionship of the public employee to the County.
may only act through its agents.

The County

The relationship with a public

ofticer is to be always strained if the officer is encouraged to
turn on the County when its potential liability is only derived from
that officer.

Additionally, if County employees are allowed, as a

matter of judicial policy, to simply "roll over" to avoid liability,
there is no practical end to the County's liability exposure.

A

defendant employee could consent to a $10 million judgment as easily
as one for $150,000.

However, if these types of contracts are voided,

the Indemnification Act would protect the cooperating employee ultimately and limit his exposure to that which the law intended.
Another basis for avoiding the assignment of indemnification rights is the appearance of collusion which could corrupt the
process of justice.

Kelly's current counsel is the same one that

rep re sen ts the judgment creditors.

The switching of sides is complete. '

The assignments encourage, and make easy, an extreme perversion of

i us r L ce.

A public employee has everything to gain by making a deal

ei Lher· formally or informally to enter a consent judgment, assign
l

n

11,

1

'r

f i c c1 c ion

•.,.,y.

rights, and take a percentage of the recovery·

Lhe employee not only avoids liability but even profits
fhis tendency to evil should be stopped now as a

'"·"I '

ot public policy.
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•

In summary, the assignment hy Ke 11 Y to the original pla 1,
tiffs should be voided on f'ubli<' f>''l1cv grounds because (1) it brc
the public trust by injuring the re Lat L<lnship between the County
and its officers, (2) perjury and pervero,ion of justice are encour
aged, and (3) the appearance of collusion encourages arrangements
which work against the very policy of tort law.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT WHICH
PROVIDES FOR ACCUMULATED INTEREST ON A $150,000
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST PLAINTIFF KELLY IN THE
ORIGINAL TORT ACTION (CIVIL NO. C-78-1377) AND
COSTS OF DEFENSE, ETC.
The trial court's Amended Finding of Fact No. 2 states:
"2.

That as a self-insurer the County was obligated to

provide indemnity in accordance with the financial responsibility
limit provided by statute in the sum of $15,000.00 and to
the usual related cover age and benefits customary in the insurance
industry, including paying costs of defense for David Mac
paying interest on the entire judgment amount of $150, 000. 00, plus
costs, until the indemnity limit of $15,000.00 was paid; (emphasis
added).
A.

"Usual Related Coverage and Benefits".

The County formally objected to similar language set for
in the original findings of fact based upon the trial court's find,
ing that no contract of insurance existed,

To hold self-insuren

to some amorphous "usual related c:overagt> and benefits customary
in the insurance industry" standard is inconceivable and totally
without authority, statutory or decisional.
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B.

Attorneys Fees.

The law in Utah is well-settled that no obligation gener-<i ly PXi.c;t.s for a party to pay another party's attorney's fees in
I 1tigat

ton unless such obligation is created by contract or statute.

Stubbs

v

Heuunert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); Walker v. Sandwick,

P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976).
The duty of an insurance company to defend its insured
arises out of the policy of insurance - not out of the Safety Responsibility Act.

Since there was a finding that no insurance

policy existed in this case, and there is no statutory requirement
to defend an insured, the Court's finding of fact is in error.
C.

Costs and Fees.

The awarding of costs and fees in a declaratory judgment
action is governed by Section 78-33-10.
the court to award costs as is equitable.

That section authorizes
In Western Cas. & Sur.

Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980), this court indicated the
standard to be applied is that each party is to assume their own
costs unless incurred pursuant to litigation conducted in bad faith.
The mere existence of a justifiable controversy is insufficient to
assess costs.
Interest.

D.

Judgment in this action was made and entered against Salt
1.ake County on January 31, 1983, for the sum of $15,000.00.
011

Judgment is accruing at the rate of 12% per annum (Sec-

·,uhiecL

' l •, ll

I

0
) -

Interest

I - 1,

)

Plaintiffs were successful in persuading the trial court
t<>

gr.mt

judgment against Salt Lake County to (1) provide indemnity
-29-

in the amount of $15,000.00; (2) reimburse costs of defense and
court costs incurred in C1,,;1 r·dse

'-78-1377; and (3) pay

interest at the statutory rate on :,L')(J,000.00 until subject judgn1,
is satisfied.
The general rule is that a contract of indemnity impliea
by law in favor of one who is 1 egally liable for the negligence 01
5
another covers loss or damage and not liability.
Therefore, as
in the case of contracts of indemnity against damage, a cause of
action for indemnity based on tort does not accrue until the indem·
nitee has suffered an actual loss. 6
In this action, plaintiff Kelly has not experienced u
actual loss.

His attorney's fees incurred in defending the

tort action (Civil Case No. C-78-1377) were paid by Farmer's Insur·
ance Excki:-,ge - the liability carrier for his privately-owned ve·
hicle - and that action has since been resolved (Supreme
No. 19052).
Since plaintiff Kelly has not suffered an actual
would not be entitled to any rights of indemnification under the
7
Indemnification Act nor under an implied in law indemnification
requirement.
Plaintiffs' counsel offered no statutory or decisional
law that would support the trial court's judgment holding the appe
lant liable for paying interest on a judgment not entered against

6
7

41 AmJur2d, INDEMNI!'Y §32; Du11r1 11 !Jr·alde Asphalt Paving Co.,
175 NY 214, 67 NE 439
--------Ibid.
42 CJS Indemnity §14 c; Cunni_r1gham_v_._l!etropolitan Gov't, 476
S.W.2d 640 (Tenn. 1972)
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l

he

C'"int

y and for an amount ten times the sum the appellant could
y bP dccountable for.

,

Since the appellant cannot find any

1"1h,H1ty, whatsoever, that would support the judgment rendered
11 ere rn .

i

t '' i 11 await the respondent's brief in order to respond to

this

of the trial court's decision.
CONCLUSION
As the owner of the vehicle involved in the collision

g1v1ng rise to this suit, the appellant admits liability under the
No-fault Act.

The County has a certificate of self-insurance under

lhe No-Fault Act and has in fact paid to plaintiffs Foster and Ewing
all sums due under that act,
The appellant maintains that it is not subject to the
µrovisions of the Safety Responsibility Act by specific reference
(Section 63-48-33); that equivalent security under the No-Fault Act
(Section 31-41-5) does not mean "identical" security, for there
would then be no differentiation between the two methods of providing
security, thus giving no meaning to that section; and that the Supreme
Court's decision in Allstate v. USF&G applies only to insurance
policies issued as security under the No-Fault Act.
This approach is entirely consistent with a public policy
thac still provides the taxpayers' governing entities limited imrnu111Ly from suit; the public policy which grants governing entities
the authority only to insure their employees against liability for

'" i 11ry r•,su Lt ing from a negligent act or omission in the scope of
1

1., ',

1"'11'\'

(Section 63-30-33); and the long-standing public
tl1al

a tort-feasor should be responsible for his own mis-
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Plaintiffs take a novel apr,rn.ich to their claim for recovery.

They attempt to .i·oid rhP

lim1talions of the lndemnific:

and Goverrunental Immunity Ac rs by m,iinL,iining Kelly was merely a
permissive user of the Counly's car

They claim that permission

1

drive the automobile is the unly r<:>levant factor, thus urging thi:
Court to judicially inval i.date those statutes in every personal in
jury case involving automobiles.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court shou)j
be reversed as a result of the plaintiffs' compromise settlement
agreement of December 12 , 197 8, for the reasons previously discuss·
Public policy would dictate a reversal in this case in order to d;
courage similar secret agreements being reached which would
the public's confidence in our adversary system and
ter collus1'e
The trial court's judgment awarding accumulated interest
on an amount tenfold the judgment rendered is an anomaly that must
be reserved for analysis in appellant's reply brief.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 1983.
TED CANNON

Salt Lake County Attorney
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